Performance and Turnover in a Stochastic Partnership

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: McAdams, David
• 署名单位: Duke University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.4.107
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 107-142
• 关键词: games; COOPERATION; collusion

摘要

Suppose that players in a stochastic partnership have the option to quit and rematch anonymously. If stage-game payoffs are subject to a persistent initial shock, the (unique) social welfare-maximizing equilibrium induces a dating process in which all partners enjoy the full potential equilibrium gains from each match. By contrast, maximizing social welfare in non-stochastic repeated games with rematching requires that players burn money or otherwise fail to realize all potential equilibrium gains. Comparative statics on welfare and turnover are also provided, consistent with documented patterns of survivorship bias and honeymoon. (JEL C72, C73, C78)