Intermediation Reduces Punishment (and Reward)

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Coffman, Lucas C.
• 署名单位: University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.4.77
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 77-106
• 关键词: conditional cooperation; moral judgment; fairness; preferences; RECIPROCITY; incentives; constraint; DELEGATION; BEHAVIOR

摘要

This paper shows moral decision making is not well predicted by the overall fairness of an act but rather by the fairness of the consequences that follow directly. In laboratory experiments, third-party punishment for keeping money from a poorer player decreases when an intermediary actor is included in the transaction. This is true for completely passive intermediaries, even though intermediation decreases the payout of the poorest player and hurts equity, and because intermediation distances the transgressor from the outcome. A separate study shows rewards of charitable giving decrease when the saliency of an intermediary is increased. (JEL A13, D63, D64)