Exclusive Contracts, Innovation, and Welfare

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yongmin; Sappington, David E. M.
• 署名单位: University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder; State University System of Florida; University of Florida
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.3.2.194
• 发表日期: 2011
• 页码: 194-220
• 关键词: naked exclusion; damage measures; breach; EFFICIENCY; RELIANCE; entry

摘要

We extend Philippe Aghion and Patrick Bolton's (1987) classic model to analyze the equilibrium incidence and impact of exclusive contracts in a setting where research and development (R&D) drives industry performance. An exclusive contract between an incumbent supplier and a buyer arises when patent protection and/or the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. The exclusive contract generally reduces the entrant's R&D, and can reduce the incumbent's R&D. Exclusive contracts reduce welfare if the incumbent's R&D ability is sufficiently limited, but can increase welfare if patent protection and the incumbent's R&D ability are sufficiently pronounced. (JEL D86, L14, O31)