Public Debt and the Political Economy of Reforms

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Boyer, Pierre C.; Roberson, Brian; Esslinger, Christoph
• 署名单位: Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; Purdue University System; Purdue University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220238
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 459-491
• 关键词: cultivate favored minorities; fiscal rules; POLICY; incentives; DISCRETION; Deficit; institutions; INEFFICIENCY; COMPETITION; STABILITY

摘要

How do electoral incentives influence the choice to experiment with a policy reform that generates uncertain future benefits? To answer this question, , we examine a two-period model of redistributive politics with uncertain policy outcomes involving a mixture of private and public benefits. . In equilibrium, , we find that the intertemporal trade-off between current policy costs and future benefits creates an incentive for politicians to use public debt to smooth spending across periods. . The higher the share of policy benefits that are in the form of a public good, , the higher the level of available debt-related spending on targeted policies that is necessary. . ( JEL D63, D72, E23, H41, H63)