Innovation in Decentralized Markets: Technology versus Synthetic Products

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Rostek, Marzena; Yoon, Ji Hee
• 署名单位: University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; University of London; University College London; University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220138
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 63-109
• 关键词: design; auction

摘要

Advances in market -clearing technology for multiple assets and synthetic products present alternative ways to leverage complementarities and substitutabilites in asset payoffs. This paper compares their equilibrium and welfare effects. In competitive markets , either instrument can mimic the efficient design. When traders have price impact , however , synthetic products and market -clearing technology provide separate instruments for impacting markets' performance and can generate synergies or trade-offs. Neither instrument can generally reproduce the other's payoffs state by state. Moreover , innovation in market clearing renders additional synthetic products nonredundant. Our analysis points to the advantages of each type of innovation while also exposing potential risks. (JEL D44, D47, G11, G12, G13, O31)