Monitoring Teams

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Halac, Marina; Kremer, Ilan; Winter, Eyal
• 署名单位: Yale University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of Warwick; Lancaster University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220260
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 134-161
• 关键词: Moral hazard; incentives; partnerships; COORDINATION; EFFICIENCY

摘要

A principal incentivizes a group of agents to work by choosing a monitoring structure and a scheme of performance-contingent rewards. The monitoring structure partitions the set of agents into monitoring teams, , each delivering a signal of joint performance. We show that unlike under partial implementation, , the principal always exhausts her monitoring capacity to optimally implement work as a unique outcome. Optimal monitoring teams are homogeneous between them: equally sized and with agents allocated in an anti-assortative fashion. Higher-effort-cost agents receive lower rents, , and they tend to be monitored more closely than lower-effort-cost agents when the principal's allocation is constrained. ( JEL D82, D86, M54) )