Everyday Econometricians: Selection Neglect and Overoptimism When Learning from Others

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barron, Kai; Huck, Steffen; Jehiel, Philippe
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200030
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 162-198
• 关键词: sample selection; overconfidence; BIAS; equilibrium; INFORMATION; INVESTMENT; confidence

摘要

This study explores selection neglect in an experimental investment game where individuals can learn from others' outcomes. . Experiment 1 examines aggregate-level equilibrium behavior. . We fiind strong evidence of selection neglect and corroborate several comparative static predictions of Jehiel's ( 2018 ) model, , showing that the severity of the bias is aggravated by the sophistication of other individuals and moderated when information is more correlated across individuals. . Experiment 2 focuses on individual decision-making, , isolating the influencel of beliefs from possible confounding factors. . This allows us to classify individuals according to their degree of naivety and explore the limits of, , and potential remedies for, , selection neglect. . ( JEL C91, D12, D83, D91, G41) )