An Alternative to Signaling: Directed Search and Substitution

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Levy, Matthew; Szentes, Balazs
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150116
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 1-15
• 关键词: skill complementarity; marriage; TECHNOLOGY; INEQUALITY; MODEL

摘要

This paper analyzes a labor market, where: workers can acquire an observable skill at no cost, firms differ in unobserved productivity, workers' skill and firms' productivity are substitutes, and firms' search is directed. The main result is that, if the entry cost of firms is small, no worker acquires the skill in the unique equilibrium. For intermediate entry costs, a positive measure of workers obtain the skill, and the number of skilled workers goes to one as entry costs become large. Welfare is highest when the entry cost is high.