Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cvitanic, Jaksa; Georgiadis, George
• 署名单位: California Institute of Technology; Northwestern University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160018
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 309-342
• 关键词: commitment; provision; resource; projects

摘要

We analyze a game in which a group of agents exerts costly effort over time to make progress on a project. The project is completed once the cumulative effort reaches a prespecified threshold, at which point it generates a lump-sum payoff. We characterize a budget-balanced mechanism that induces each agent to exert the first-best effort level as the outcome of a Markov perfect equilibrium, thus eliminating the free-rider problem. We also show how our mechanism can be adapted to other dynamic games with externalities, such as strategic experimentation and the dynamic extraction of a common resource.