Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Lacetera, Nicola; Larsen, Bradley J.; Pope, Devin G.; Sydnor, Justin R.
• 署名单位: University of Toronto; University Toronto Mississauga; National Bureau of Economic Research; Stanford University; University of Chicago; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150020
• 发表日期: 2016
• 页码: 195-229
• 关键词: competitive arousal; english auctions; MODEL; inference; fever; price

摘要

Auction design has been studied extensively; however, within a given design, does the process of how an auction is conducted matter as well? We address this question by looking for heterogeneity in the performance of auctioneers in English auctions. We analyze over 850,000 wholesale used car auctions and find significant differences across auctioneers in outcomes for otherwise similar cars. The performance heterogeneities are stable across time and correlate with subjective evaluations by the auction house. We discuss the mechanisms driving differential performance and find evidence suggesting a role for tactics that generate bidder excitement or urgency.