Designing Matching Mechanisms under General Distributional Constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Goto, Masahiro; Kojima, Fuhito; Kurata, Ryoji; Tamura, Akihisa; Yokoo, Makoto
• 署名单位: Kyushu University; Stanford University; Keio University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20160124
• 发表日期: 2017
• 页码: 226-262
• 关键词: School choice; college admissions; algorithms

摘要

To handle various applications, we study matching under constraints. The only requirement on the constraints is heredity; given a feasible matching, any matching with fewer students at each school is also feasible. Heredity subsumes existing constraints such as regional maximum quotas and diversity constraints. With constraints, there may not exist a matching that satisfies fairness and nonwastefulness (i. e., stability). We demonstrate our new mechanism, the Adaptive Deferred Acceptance mechanism (ADA), satisfies strategy-proofness for students, nonwastefulness, and a weaker fairness property. We also offer a technique to apply ADA even if heredity is violated (e.g., minimum quotas).