A Pseudo-Market Approach to Allocation with Priorities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: He, Yinghua; Miralles, Antonio; Pycia, Marek; Yan, Jianye
• 署名单位: Rice University; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Autonomous University of Barcelona; University of Zurich; Peking University; University of International Business & Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20150259
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 272-314
• 关键词: high-school match; boston mechanism; assignment problem; CHOICE; incentives; STABILITY; Indifferences; EFFICIENCY; transfers

摘要

We propose a pseudo-market mechanism for no-monetary-transfer allocation of indivisible objects based on priorities such as those in school choice. Agents are given token money, face priority-specific prices, and buy utility-maximizing random assignments. The mechanism is asymptotically incentive compatible, and the resulting assignments are fair and constrained Pareto efficient. Hylland and Zeckhauser's (1979) position-allocation problem is a special case of our framework, and our results on incentives and fairness are also new in their classical setting.