Coarse Grades: Informing the Public by Withholding Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Harbaugh, Rick; Rasmusen, Eric
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20130078
• 发表日期: 2018
• 页码: 210-235
• 关键词: Certification; MODEL

摘要

Certifiers of quality often report only coarse grades to the public despite having measured quality more finely, e.g., Pass or Certified instead of 73 out of 100. Why? We show that coarse grades result in more information being provided to the public because the coarseness encourages those of middling quality to apply for certification. Dropping exact grading in favor of the best coarse grading scheme reduces public uncertainty because the extra participation outweighs the coarser reporting. In some circumstances, the coarsest meaningful grading scheme, pass-fail grading, results in the most information.