Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Fudenberg, Drew; Vespa, Emanuel
• 署名单位: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180317
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 186-215
• 关键词: extensive-form games; equilibrium dominance; INFORMATION; BEHAVIOR; refinements; ambiguity; selection; aversion; search; models

摘要

We study the effect of how types are assigned to participants in a signaling-game experiment. The sender has two actions, In and Out, and two types. In one treatment, types are i.i.d. in every period, and senders gather experience with both types. In the other, types are assigned once-and-for-all, and feedback is type specific. The theory of learning in games predicts that the non-Nash but self-confirming equilibrium where some fraction of types play Out can persist in the fixed-type treatment but not when types are i.i.d. Our results confirm that more senders do play Out in the fixed-type treatment.