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作者：Chang, Jen-Wen
作者单位：California State University System; California State University Fullerton
摘要：An entrepreneur finances her project via crowdfunding. She chooses a funding mechanism (fixed or flexible), a price, and a funding goal. Under fixed funding, money is refunded if the goal is not met; under flexible funding, there is no refund. Backers observe signals about project value and decide whether to contribute or postpone purchase to the retail stage. Using the linkage principle, we show that the optimal campaign uses fixed funding. Furthermore, we show that an entrepreneur who is not...
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作者：Henry, Emeric; Louis-Sidois, Charles
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：Members of groups and organizations often have to decide on rules that regulate their contributions to common tasks. They typically differ in their propensity to contribute and often care about the image they project; in particular, they want to be perceived by other group members as being high contributors. In such environments we study the interaction between how members vote on rules and their subsequent contribution decisions. We show that making contributions visible affects the calculus ...
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作者：Cao, Dan; Lagunoff, Roger
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：We examine the role of collateral in a dynamic model of optimal credit contracts in which a borrower values both housing and nonhousing consumption. The borrower's private information about his income is the only friction. An optimal contract is collateralized when in some state, some portion of the borrower's net worth is forfeited to the lender. We show that optimal contracts are always collateralized. The total value of forfeited assets is decreasing in income, highlighting the role of coll...
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作者：Cherchye, Laurens; Demuynck, Thomas; De Rock, Bram; Surana, Khushboo
作者单位：KU Leuven; Universite Libre de Bruxelles; KU Leuven; University of York - UK
摘要：We present a revealed preference methodology for nonparametric demand analysis under the assumption of normal goods. Our methodology is flexible in that it allows for imposing normality on any subset of goods. We show the usefulness of our methodology for empirical welfare analysis through cost-of-living indices. An illustration to US consumption data drawn from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) demonstrates that mild normality assumptions can substantially strengthen the empirical ana...
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作者：Lazzati, Natalia
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Cruz
摘要：This paper studies the diffusion process of two complementary technologies among people who are connected through a social network. It characterizes adoption rates over time for different initial allocations and network structures. In doing so, we provide some microfoundations for the stochastic formation of consideration sets. We are particularly interested in the following question: suppose we want to maximize technology diffusion and have a limited number of units of each of the two technol...
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作者：Adams, Abi
作者单位：University of Oxford; University of Oxford
摘要：Revealed preference restrictions are increasingly used to predict demand behavior at new budgets of interest and as shape restrictions in nonparametric estimation exercises. However, the restrictions imposed are not sufficient for rationality when predictions are made at multiple budgets. 1 highlight the non-convexities in the set of predictions that arise when making multiple predictions. 1 develop a mixed integer programming characterization of the problem that can be used to impose rational...
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作者：Lagerlof, Johan N. M.
作者单位：University of Copenhagen
摘要：In many contests in economic and political life, both all-pay and winner-pay expenditures matter for winning. This paper studies such hybrid contests under symmetry and asymmetry. The symmetric model assumes very little structure but yields a simple closed-form solution. More contestants tend to lead to substitution toward winner-pay investments, and total expenditures are always lower than in the corresponding all-pay contest. With a biased decision process and two contestants, the favored co...
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作者：Janssen, Maarten C. W.; Ke, T. Tony
作者单位：University of Vienna; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：Since Telser (1960), there is a well-established argument that a competitive market will not provide service due to freeriding. We show that with search frictions, the market may well provide service if the cost of doing so is not too large. Any market equilibrium with service provision has two or more firms providing service, implying overprovision of service as the social optimum mandates at most one service provider Firms that provide service and those that do not can coexist, where consume...
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作者：Benkert, Jean-Michel; Letina, Igor
作者单位：University of Zurich; University of Bern; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：This paper studies the optimal design of dynamic research contests. We introduce interim transfers, which are paid in every period while the contest is ongoing, to an otherwise standard setting. We show that a contest where (i) the principal can stop the contest in any period, (ii) a constant interim transfer is paid to agents in each period while the contest is ongoing, and (iii) a final prize is paid once the principal stops the contest, is optimal for the principal and implements the first-...
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作者：Echenique, Federico; Imai, Taisuke; Saito, Kota
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; University of Munich
摘要：We present revealed-preference characterizations of the most common models of intertemporal choice: the model of exponentially discounted concave utility, and some of its generalizations. Our characterizations take consumption data as primitives, and provide nonparametric revealed-preference tests. We apply our tests to data from two recent experiments and find that our axiomatization delivers new insights and perspectives on datasets that had been analyzed by traditional parametric methods.
