Cadet-Branch Matching in a Kelso-Crawford Economy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jagadeesan, Ravi
• 署名单位: Harvard University; Harvard University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170192
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 191-224
• 关键词: Contracts; STABILITY; salaries; DESIGN

摘要

Sonmez (2013) and Sonmez and Switzer (2013) used matching theory with unilaterally substitutable priorities to propose mechanisms to match cadets to military branches. This paper shows that, alternatively, the Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer mechanisms can be constructed as descending salary adjustment processes in Kelso-Crawford (1982) economies in which cadets are (grossly) substitutable. The lengths of service contracts serve as (inverse) salaries. The underlying substitutability explains the unilateral substitutability of the priorities utilized by Sonmez and Sonmez-Switzer.