Coercive Trade Policy

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anesi, Vincent; Facchini, Giovanni
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; University of Nottingham; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; IZA Institute Labor Economics
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20170085
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 225-256
• 关键词: DISPUTE SETTLEMENT; ENFORCEMENT; AGREEMENTS; Retaliation; SANCTIONS; TARIFFS; escape; GATT

摘要

Coercion is used by one government (the sender) to influence the trade practices of another (the target). We build a two-country trade model in which coercion can be exercised unilaterally or channeled through a weak international organization without enforcement powers. We show that unilateral coercion may be ineffective because signaling incentives lead the sender to demand a concession so substantial to make it unacceptable to the target. If the sender can instead commit to the international organization's dispute settlement mechanism, then compliance is more likely because the latter places a cap on the sender's incentives to signal its resolve.