Full Implementation under Ambiguity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Guo, Huiyi; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
• 署名单位: Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station; University of Iowa
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20180184
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 148-178
• 关键词: Mechanism design; incomplete information; maskin theorem; uncertainty

摘要

This paper introduces the maxmin expected utility framework into the problem of fully implementing a social choice set as ambiguous equilibria. Our model incorporates the Bayesian framework and the Wald-type maxmin preferences as special cases and provides insights beyond the Bayesian implementation literature. We establish necessary and almost sufficient conditions for a social choice set to be fully implementable. Under the Wald-type maxmin preferences, we provide easy-to-check sufficient conditions for implementation. As applications, we implement the set of ambiguous Pareto-efficient and individually rational social choice functions, the maxmin core, the maxmin weak core, and the maxmin value.