Policy Experimentation in Committees: A Case against Veto Rights under Redistributive Constraints

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Anesi, Vincent; Bowen, T. Renee
• 署名单位: University of Nottingham; University of California System; University of California San Diego; National Bureau of Economic Research
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20190023
• 发表日期: 2021
• 页码: 124-162
• 关键词: POLITICAL-ECONOMY; stochastic-model; equilibria; REFORM

摘要

We study optimal policy experimentation by a committee. We consider a dynamic bargaining game in which committee members choose either a risky reform or a safe alternative each period. When no redistribution is allowed, the unique equilibrium outcome is generically inefficient. When redistribution is allowed (even small amounts), there always exists an equilibrium that supports optimal experimentation for any voting rule without veto players. With veto players, however, optimal policy experimentation is possible only with a sufficient amount of redistribution. We conclude that veto rights are more of an obstacle to optimal policy experimentation than are the constraints on redistribution themselves.