Blind Disclosures

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Kolb, Aaron; Pease, Marilyn; Sacks, Daniel W.; Quick, Joshua
• 署名单位: Indiana University System; IU Kelley School of Business; Indiana University Bloomington; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison; Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210182
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 41-79
• 关键词: Information disclosure; quality disclosure; certification; preferences; news

摘要

We develop and test a theory of blind disclosure. A sender chooses whether to disclose information based on a preliminary, private sig-nal. In the unique equilibrium, contrary to the literature's canonical unraveling result, senders disclose only if their preliminary signal exceeds a cutoff. This cutoff rule leads to partial unraveling in envi-ronments with either risk aversion or moral hazard, and disclo-sure decreases with uncertainty. Using unique administrative data on disclosed and undisclosed grades in a large university, we find that the model is consistent with student choices during spring 2020 to conceal letter grades by switching to optional pass-fail grades. (JEL D81, D82, I23)