Auction Mechanisms and Treasury Revenue: Evidence from the Chinese Experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Barbosa, K. L. E. N. I. O.; De Silva, Dakshina g.; Yang, L. I. Y. U.; Yoshimoto, H. I. S. A. Y. U. K. I.
• 署名单位: Universite Cote d'Azur; SKEMA Business School; Lancaster University; Nanjing Audit University; University of Glasgow
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200216
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 394-419
• 关键词: divisible good auctions; 1st-price auctions; sample selection; price auctions; MARKET; entry; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; collusion; BEHAVIOR

摘要

This paper exploits a large-scale auction experiment conducted by two Chinese government treasury security issuers-the Chinese Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank-to investigate whether treasury securities should be sold through uniform price or discriminatory price auction mechanisms. Based on the outcomes of more than 300 treasury securities issued through an alternating auction-rule market experiment, we find that yield rates of the two auction formats are not statistically different. Further, these esti-mates indicate there is no significant economic difference in terms of revenue between the two auction mechanisms. This result is robust across different bond yield-rate measurements and participation behavior. (JEL D44, E63, G12, O16, P34)