Ten Isn't Large! Group Size and Coordination in a Large-Scale Experiments

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Arifovic, Jasmina; Hommes, Cars; Kopanyi-Peuker, Anita; Salle, Isabelle
• 署名单位: Simon Fraser University; Bank of Canada; University of Amsterdam; Tinbergen Institute; Radboud University Nijmegen; University of Ottawa
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200290
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 580-617
• 关键词: Strategic uncertainty; efficient coordination; public-goods; Bank runs; COOPERATION; equilibria; sunspots; provision; games

摘要

We provide experimental evidence on coordination within large groups that could proxy the atomistic nature of real-world mar-kets. We use a bank run game where the two pure-strategy equilib-ria can be ranked by payoff and risk dominance and a sequence of public announcements introduces stochastic sunspot equilibria. We find systematic group size effects that theory fails to predict. When the payoff-dominant strategy is risky enough, the behavior of small groups is uninformative of the behavior in large groups: unlike smaller groups of size ten, larger groups exclusively coordinate on the Pareto-inferior strategy and never coordinate on sunspots. (JEL C92, D83, D91, G21)