Debunking Rumors in Networks

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Merlino, Luca P.; Pin, Paolo; Tabasso, Nicole
• 署名单位: Universite Libre de Bruxelles; University of Antwerp; University of Siena; Bocconi University; University of Surrey
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20200403
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 467-496
• 关键词: Social networks; INFORMATION; ECONOMICS; diffusion

摘要

We study the diffusion of a true and a false message (the rumor) in a social network. Upon hearing a message, individuals may believe it, disbelieve it, or debunk it through costly verification. Whenever the truth survives in steady state, so does the rumor. Communication intensity in itself is irrelevant for relative rumor prevalence, and the effect of homophily depends on the exact verification process and equilibrium verification rates. Our model highlights that successful policies in the fight against rumors increase individuals' incentives to verify. (JEL D83, D85, L82, Z13)