Self-Reported Signaling

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jungbauer, Thomas; Waldman, Michael
• 署名单位: Cornell University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20210204
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 78-117
• 关键词: employee theft; INFORMATION; deception; returns; games

摘要

In many real-world settings, an action that affects the value of a product or service is self-reported rather than publicly observable. We investigate self-reporting when self-reports serve as a signal of sender productivity. In our model, a sender chooses an action and then sends a message concerning the action to multiple receivers. Receivers then bid for the sender's service after deciding whether to audit the sender. We find that self-reporting can reverse the standard result in signaling models that there is overinvestment in the action and that the possibility of misrepresentation may in fact improve welfare given self-reported signaling.