Multihoming and Oligopolistic Platform Competitions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Teh, Tat-How; Liu, Chunchun; Wright, Julian; Zhou, Junhe
• 署名单位: Nanyang Technological University; National University of Singapore; National University of Singapore; Tsinghua University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 68-113
• 关键词: 2-sided markets; INFORMATION; mergers

摘要

We provide a general framework to analyze competition between any number of symmetric two-sided transaction platforms, in which buyers and sellers can multihome. We show how key primitives such as the number of platforms, the fraction of buyers that find multihoming costly, the value of transactions, and the degree of user heterogeneity jointly determine the level and structure of platform fees. Even though platform entry always reduces the total fee level, whether it shifts the fee structure in favor of buyers or sellers depends on whether most of the buyers are singlehoming or multihoming. (JEL D43, L11, L13, L40)