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作者：Armand, Alex; Coutts, Alexander; Vicente, Pedro C.; Vilela, Ines
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
摘要：Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surv...
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作者：Verner, Emil; Gyongyosi, Gyozo
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Leibniz Association; Institut fur Weltwirtschaft an der Universitat Kiel (IFW)
摘要：We examine the consequences of a sudden increase in household debt burdens by exploiting variation in exposure to household foreign currency debt during Hungary's late-2008 currency crisis. The revaluation of debt burdens causes higher default rates and a collapse in spending. These responses lead to a worse local recession, driven by a decline in local demand, and negative spillover effects on nearby borrowers without foreign currency debt. The estimates translate into an output multiplier on...
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作者：Banerjee, Abhijit, V; Chassang, Sylvain; Montero, Sergio; Snowberg, Erik
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); New York University; University of Rochester; University of British Columbia
摘要：This paper studies the problem of experiment design by an ambiguity-averse decision-maker who trades off subjective expected performance against robust performance guarantees. This framework accounts for real-world experimenters' preference for randomization. It also clarifies the circumstances in which randomization is optimal: when the available sample size is large and robustness is an important concern. We apply our model to shed light on the practice of rerandomization, used to improve ba...
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作者：Jones, Charles, I; Tonetti, Christopher
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Data is nonrival: a person's location history, medical records, and driving data can be used by many firms simultaneously. Nonrivalry leads to increasing returns. As a result, there may be social gains to data being used broadly across firms, even in the presence of privacy considerations. Fearing creative destruction, firms may choose to hoard their data, leading to the inefficient use of nonrival data. Giving data property rights to consumers can generate allocations that are close to optima...
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作者：Bocola, Luigi; Lorenzoni, Guido
作者单位：Stanford University; Northwestern University
摘要：Foreign currency debt is considered a source of financial instability in emerging markets. We propose a theory in which liability dollarization arises from an insurance motive of domestic savers. Since financial crises are associated to depreciations, savers ask for a risk premium when saving in local currency. This force makes domestic currency debt expensive, and incentivizes borrowers to issue foreign currency debt. Providing ex post support to borrowers can alleviate the effect of the cris...
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作者：Goldsmith-Pinkham, Paul; Sorkin, Isaac; Swift, Henry
作者单位：Yale University; Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：The Bartik instrument is formed by interacting local industry shares and national industry growth rates. We show that the typical use of a Bartik instrument assumes a pooled exposure research design, where the shares measure differential exposure to common shocks, and identification is based on exogeneity of the shares. Next, we show how the Bartik instrument weights each of the exposure designs. Finally, we discuss how to assess the plausibility of the research design. We illustrate our resul...
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作者：Banerjee, Abhijit Vinayak
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
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作者：Chakraborty, Archishman; Ghosh, Parikshit; Roy, Jaideep
作者单位：Yeshiva University; University of Delhi; Delhi School of Economics; University of Bath
摘要：Does public cheap talk by a biased expert benefit voters? The answer depends on the nature of democratic institutions and the extent of communication possibilities. Expert endorsements induce office-seeking parties to serve the expert's interests, hurting voters. Expert advocacy makes policies respond to information, helping voters. Together, policy advocacy and partisan endorsements are often better than either alone. Their interaction creates a delegation benefit that makes indirect democrac...
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作者：Gurkaynak, Refet S.; Kisacikoglu, Burcin; Wright, Jonathan H.
作者单位：Ihsan Dogramaci Bilkent University; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Johns Hopkins University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Macroeconomic news announcements are elaborate and multi-dimensional. We consider a framework in which jumps in asset prices around announcements reflect both the response to observed surprises in headline numbers and to latent factors, reflecting other news in the release. Non-headline news, for which there are no expectations surveys, is unobservable to the econometrician but nonetheless elicits a market response. We estimate the model by the Kalman filter, which efficiently combines OLS and...
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作者：Bertrand, Marianne; Bombardini, Matilde; Fisman, Raymond; Trebbi, Francesco
作者单位：University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); University of British Columbia; Boston University
摘要：We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC con...
