Financial Crises, Dollarization, and Lending of Last Resort in Open Economies
成果类型:
Article
署名作者:
Bocola, Luigi; Lorenzoni, Guido
署名单位:
Stanford University; Northwestern University
刊物名称:
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
ISSN/ISSBN:
0002-8282
DOI:
10.1257/aer.20180830
发表日期:
2020
页码:
2524-2557
关键词:
Sudden stops
Bank runs
MODEL
RISK
liquidity
fragility
cycle
debt
摘要:
Foreign currency debt is considered a source of financial instability in emerging markets. We propose a theory in which liability dollarization arises from an insurance motive of domestic savers. Since financial crises are associated to depreciations, savers ask for a risk premium when saving in local currency. This force makes domestic currency debt expensive, and incentivizes borrowers to issue foreign currency debt. Providing ex post support to borrowers can alleviate the effect of the crisis on savers' income, lowering their demand for insurance, and, surprisingly, it can reduce ex ante incentives to borrow in foreign currency.