Tax-Exempt Lobbying: Corporate Philanthropy as a Tool for Political Influence

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bertrand, Marianne; Bombardini, Matilde; Fisman, Raymond; Trebbi, Francesco
• 署名单位: University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Canadian Institute for Advanced Research (CIFAR); University of British Columbia; Boston University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20180615
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 2065-2102
• 关键词: Campaign contributions; money; returns; ECONOMY

摘要

We explore the role of charitable giving as a means of political influence. For philanthropic foundations associated with large US corporations, we present three different identification strategies that consistently point to the use of corporate social responsibility in ways that parallel the strategic use of political action committee (PAC) spending. Our estimates imply that 6.3 percent of corporate charitable giving may be politically motivated, an amount 2.5 times larger than annual PAC contributions and 35 percent of federal lobbying. Absent of disclosure requirements, charitable giving may be a form of corporate political influence undetected by voters and subsidized by taxpayers.