Does Information Break the Political Resource Curse? Experimental Evidence from Mozambique

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Armand, Alex; Coutts, Alexander; Vicente, Pedro C.; Vilela, Ines
• 署名单位: Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; Universidade Nova de Lisboa; University of London; Royal Holloway University London
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20190842
• 发表日期: 2020
• 页码: 3431-3453
• 关键词: NATURAL-RESOURCES; field experiment; rent-seeking; CONFLICT; OIL; institutions; windfalls; inference; selection; crime

摘要

Natural resources can have a negative impact on the economy through corruption and civil conflict. This paper tests whether information can counteract this political resource curse. We implement a large-scale field experiment following the dissemination of information about a substantial natural gas discovery in Mozambique. We measure outcomes related to the behavior of citizens and local leaders through georeferenced conflict data, behavioral activities, lab-in-the-field experiments, and surveys. We find that information targeting citizens and their involvement in public deliberations increases local mobilization and decreases violence. By contrast, when information reaches only local leaders, it increases elite capture and rent-seeking.