Value of information in social learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sato, Hiroto; Shimizu, Konan
• 署名单位: Nagoya University; Keio University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106232
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: LARGE DEMAND; LAW

摘要

This study extends Blackwell (1953) comparison of information to a sequential social learning model in which agents make decisions sequentially based on both private signals and observed actions of others. In this context, we introduce a binary relation over information structures: an information structure is more socially valuable than another if it yields higher expected payoffs for all agents, regardless of their preferences and equilibrium realizations. First, we establish that this binary relation is strictly stronger than the Blackwell order. Next, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for our binary relation and propose a simpler sufficient condition that is easier to verify. We further explore comparisons of information structures in terms of long-run payoffs, limit welfare, and canonical binary environments.