Local non-bossiness

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Duque-Rosas, Eduardo; Pereyra, Juan S.; Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Universidad de Montevideo; Universidad de Chile
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106230
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: college admissions problem; school choice; STABILITY; allocation; mechanisms; preferences

摘要

The student-optimal stable mechanism (DA), the most popular mechanism in school choice, is the only one that is stable and strategy-proof. However, when DA is implemented, a student can change the schools of others without changing her own. We show that this drawback is limited: a student cannot change her schoolmates while remaining at the same school. We refer to this new property as local non-bossiness and use it to provide a new characterization of DA that does not rely on stability. Furthermore, we show that local non-bossiness plays a crucial role in providing incentives to be truthful when students have preferences over their colleagues. As long as students have school-lexicographic preferences over colleagues-meaning that they first consider the school to which they are assigned and then their schoolmates-DA induces the only stable and strategy-proof mechanism. There is limited room to expand this preference domain without compromising the existence of a stable and strategy-proof mechanism.