On the efficiency of runnable banking arrangements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Andolfatto, David; Nosal, Ed
• 署名单位: University of Miami; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Atlanta
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2026.106221
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Contracts

摘要

Financial arrangements involving illiquid assets financed by liquid liabilities are often viewed as inherently runnable. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) show that this is true when risk-sharing arrangements are not optimally designed. Peck and Shell (2003) and Ennis and Keister (2009, 2016), however, demonstrate that runnable banking arrangements can be constrained-efficient when liquidity demand is uncertain and withdrawals must be processed on a first-come, first-served basis. We show that this insight extends to environments in which redemptions are not subject to a sequential service constraint. Instead, increasing returns to scale in banking-consistent with empirical evidence-can generate regions of the parameter space in which the constrained-efficient allocation is runnable. Runnable banking arrangements can be constrained-efficient when the minimum scale required to realize economies of scale is difficult to attain during large redemption events, when the penalty for failing to achieve scale is small, and when the likelihood of a coordinated run is low1.