-
作者：De los Santos, Babur; O'Brien, Daniel P.; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.
作者单位：Clemson University; University of Arizona; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：This paper studies the pricing implications of wholesale and agency contracts when input terms are determined through bargaining. We develop a structural Nash-in-Nash bargaining model and show that the distribution of bargaining power determines whether agency contracts raise or lower retail prices relative to wholesale contracts. We apply the model to the e-book market, which transitioned from wholesale to agency contracts after the expiration of a ban on agency contracting. Estimates indicat...
-
作者：Apesteguia, Jose; Ballester, Miguel A.
作者单位：ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University; University of Oxford; Basque Foundation for Science; University of Basque Country
摘要：In this paper, we propose a novel way to measure behavioral heterogeneity in a population of stochastic individuals. Our measure is choice-based; it evaluates the probability that, over a randomly selected menu, the sampled choices of two sampled individuals differ. We provide axiomatic foundations for this measure and a decomposition result that separates heterogeneity into its intrapersonal and interpersonal components. (JEL D01, D11, D91)
-
作者：Bizzotto, Jacopo; Hinnosaar, Toomas; Vigier, Adrien
作者单位：Oslo Metropolitan University (OsloMet); University of Nottingham
摘要：We study limited strategic leadership. A collection of subsets covering the leader's action space determines her commitment opportunities. We characterize the outcomes resulting from all possible commitment structures of this kind. If the commitment structure is an interval partition, then the leader's payoff is bounded by her Stackelberg and Cournot payoffs. Under general commitment structures, the leader may obtain a payoff that is less than her lowest Cournot payoff. We apply our results to...
-
作者：Catonini, Emiliano; Penta, Antonio
作者单位：New York University; NYU Shanghai; ICREA; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：Backward induction (BI) is only defined for perfect information games, but its logic is also invoked in many concepts for imperfect or incomplete information games. Yet, the meaning of BI reasoning is not clear in these settings, and we lack a way to capture the essence of BI without assuming equilibrium. We introduce backward rationalizability, a nonequilibrium solution concept for incomplete information games, which we argue distills the logic of BI reasoning. We show several of its properti...
-
作者：Dworczak, Piotr
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：I study a simple equity-efficiency problem: A designer allocates a fixed amount of money to a population of agents differing in privately observed marginal values for money. She can only screen by imposing an ordeal-that is, by allocating more money to agents who engage in a socially wasteful activity (such as queuing or filling out forms). Giving a lump-sum transfer is outperformed by an ordeal mechanism when agents with the lowest money-denominated cost of engaging in the wasteful activity h...
-
作者：Eilat, Ran; Neeman, Zvika; Solan, Eilon
作者单位：Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We introduce a new type of games, called opportunity-hunting games, in which two players compete to discover an uncertain event (opportunity) that occurs at an unobserved and random point in time. Players can inspect whether the event has already occurred again and again, but each inspection is costly. Varying the parameters of the model spans the range from games where competition between the players to be the first to identify the opportunity is the dominant force, to games in which free ri...
-
作者：Ebert, Sebastian; Koster, Mats
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Penny-picking refers to the often-observed phenomenon of repeatedly taking negatively skewed risks and seems directly at odds with evidence on (positive-) skewness-seeking as observed in static settings. We show that penny-picking may not only occur despite skewness-seeking, but-seemingly paradoxically-because of skewness-seeking. With sufficient time available, risks with arbitrary negative skewness can be gambled in such a way that, overall, skewness is positive. Therefore, classical behavio...
-
作者：Jungbauer, Thomas; Nicholson, Sean; Pan, June; Waldman, Michael; Wang, Lucy Xiaolu
作者单位：Cornell University; Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
摘要：Why do firms outsource research and development (R&D) for some products while conducting R&D in-house for similar ones? An innovating firm risks cannibalizing its existing products. The more profitable these products, the more the firm wants to limit cannibalization. We apply this logic to the organization of R&D by introducing a novel theoretical model in which developing in-house provides the firm more control over the new product's location in product space. An empirical analysis of our tes...
-
作者：Blumenthal, Benjamin
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：Does more information benefit voters? I examine this question in a novel setting of distributive politics and electoral accountability. Homogeneously informed electorates can benefit from less information through improvements in the control or screening of politicians. For heterogeneously informed electorates, I show that the distribution of resources and voter welfare is affected by the nature of informational heterogeneity and by voters' ability to communicate with each other, making less-in...
-
作者：Myatt, David P.; Ronayne, David
作者单位：University of London; London Business School; European School of Management & Technology
摘要：We generalize the captive-and-shopper model of sales to allow asymmetries in production costs and captive audiences, in oligopoly. Both kinds of asymmetry determine the firms that compete (via randomized sales) to serve the price-comparing shoppers, while other firms exploit their captive audiences. In contrast to a model with symmetric costs (but asymmetric captive audiences), there are natural situations in which more than two firms use sales by engaging in pairwise battles across distinct p...
