Asymmetric Models of Sales

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Myatt, David P.; Ronayne, David
• 署名单位: University of London; London Business School; European School of Management & Technology
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240437
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: price dispersion; unique equilibrium; generalized-model; search; INFORMATION; contests; distributions; COMPETITION; EXISTENCE; internet

摘要

We generalize the captive-and-shopper model of sales to allow asymmetries in production costs and captive audiences, in oligopoly. Both kinds of asymmetry determine the firms that compete (via randomized sales) to serve the price-comparing shoppers, while other firms exploit their captive audiences. In contrast to a model with symmetric costs (but asymmetric captive audiences), there are natural situations in which more than two firms use sales by engaging in pairwise battles across distinct price intervals. We also study the choice of production technologies via innovation and extensions to consider costly acquisitions of captives and shoppers, and captives' choice of captor.