Opportunity Hunters: A Model of Competitive Sequential Inspections

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Eilat, Ran; Neeman, Zvika; Solan, Eilon
• 署名单位: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240245
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: continuous-time; preemption; games; adoption; WAR

摘要

We introduce a new type of games, called opportunity-hunting games, in which two players compete to discover an uncertain event (opportunity) that occurs at an unobserved and random point in time. Players can inspect whether the event has already occurred again and again, but each inspection is costly. Varying the parameters of the model spans the range from games where competition between the players to be the first to identify the opportunity is the dominant force, to games in which free riding on the other player's effort is the dominant force. We characterize the game's unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium. (JEL C72, C73)