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作者：Baumann, Leonie; Dutta, Rohan
作者单位：McGill University
摘要：A group of agents with ex ante independent and identically uncertain quality compete for a prize, awarded by a principal. Agents may possess evidence about the quality of those they share a social connection with (neighbors), and themselves. In one equilibrium, adversarial disclosure of evidence leads the principal to statistically discriminate between agents based on their number of neighbors (degree). We identify parameter values for which an agent's ex ante winning probability is monotone i...
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作者：Das, Kaustav; Mayskaya, Tatiana; Nikandrova, Arina
作者单位：University of Leicester; HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics)
摘要：We study the effect of a merger on R&D activity in a dynamic model with uncertainty about the feasibility of innovation. The merger has three effects: It may reduce the number of follow-up innovations (cannibalization effect), increase the probability of the first game-changer innovation (appropriability effect), and bring this innovation forward in time (informational effect). The model suggests mergers are more desirable when R&D outcomes are highly uncertain, but less so when the innovation...
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作者：Krasikov, Ilia; Lamba, Rohit
作者单位：Arizona State University; Arizona State University-Tempe; Cornell University
摘要：This paper builds a theory of dynamic pricing for the sale of timed goods. The main friction is private and evolving valuation of the buyer prior to the date of consumption, which follows a Poisson process. A combination of membership fees and continuously increasing prices induces a threshold response from the buyer, endogenously segmenting the market along timing of purchase. This pricing mechanism achieves the deterministic global optimum. The tools developed here are shown to be useful in ...
