Agency Pricing and Bargaining: Evidence from the E-Book Market

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De los Santos, Babur; O'Brien, Daniel P.; Wildenbeest, Matthijs R.
• 署名单位: Clemson University; University of Arizona; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20220232
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: VERTICAL CONTRACTS; welfare; DISCRIMINATION; prices; equilibrium; COMPETITION; MODEL

摘要

This paper studies the pricing implications of wholesale and agency contracts when input terms are determined through bargaining. We develop a structural Nash-in-Nash bargaining model and show that the distribution of bargaining power determines whether agency contracts raise or lower retail prices relative to wholesale contracts. We apply the model to the e-book market, which transitioned from wholesale to agency contracts after the expiration of a ban on agency contracting. Estimates indicate that the retailers have most of the bargaining power. Counterfactual simulations show that most-favored-nation clauses raise prices but would lower the profits of the publishers and Amazon. C78, D86, K21, L14, L42, L81,