The Organization of Innovation: Incomplete Contracts and the Outsourcing Decision

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jungbauer, Thomas; Nicholson, Sean; Pan, June; Waldman, Michael; Wang, Lucy Xiaolu
• 署名单位: Cornell University; Cornell University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Cornell University; University of Massachusetts System; University of Massachusetts Amherst
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240053
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: research-and-development; vertical integration; firm boundaries; COMPETITION; MARKET; PRODUCTIVITY; alliances; PROPERTY; benefits; CHOICE

摘要

Why do firms outsource research and development (R&D) for some products while conducting R&D in-house for similar ones? An innovating firm risks cannibalizing its existing products. The more profitable these products, the more the firm wants to limit cannibalization. We apply this logic to the organization of R&D by introducing a novel theoretical model in which developing in-house provides the firm more control over the new product's location in product space. An empirical analysis of our testable predictions using pharmaceutical data concerning patents, patent expiration, and outsourcing at various stages of the R&D process supports our theoretical approach.