Voter Information and Distributive Politics

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Blumenthal, Benjamin
• 署名单位: Universite Libre de Bruxelles; Fonds de la Recherche Scientifique - FNRS; Universite Libre de Bruxelles
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.20240340
• 发表日期: 2026
• 关键词: Electoral accountability; TRANSPARENCY

摘要

Does more information benefit voters? I examine this question in a novel setting of distributive politics and electoral accountability. Homogeneously informed electorates can benefit from less information through improvements in the control or screening of politicians. For heterogeneously informed electorates, I show that the distribution of resources and voter welfare is affected by the nature of informational heterogeneity and by voters' ability to communicate with each other, making less-informed voters better off than their more-informed counterparts in some cases.