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作者：Enke, Benjamin; Graeber, Thomas; Oprea, Ryan
作者单位：Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
摘要：The influence of behavioral biases on aggregate outcomes depends in part on self-selection: whether rational people opt more strongly into aggregate interactions than biased individuals. In betting mar-ket, auction and committee experiments, we document that some errors are strongly reduced through self-selection, while others are not affected at all or even amplified. A large part of this variation is explained by differences in the relationship between confidence and performance. In some tas...
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作者：Corrao, Roberto; Flynn, Joel P.; Sastry, Karthik A.
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We study the nonlinear pricing of goods whose usage generates revenue for the seller and of which buyers can freely dispose. The optimal price schedule is a multi-part tariff, featuring tiers within which buyers pay a marginal price of zero. We apply our model to digital goods, for which advertising, data generation, and network effects make usage valuable, but monitoring legitimate usage is infeasible. Our results rationalize common pricing schemes including free products, free trials, and un...
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作者：Sampson, Thomas
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper quantifies the contribution of technology gaps to inter-national income inequality. I develop an endogenous growth model where cross-country differences in R&D efficiency and cross-industry differences in innovation and adoption opportunities together determine equilibrium technology gaps, trade patterns, and income inequality. Countries with higher R&D efficiency are richer and have comparative advantage in more innovation-dependent industries. I calibrate R&D efficiency by country...
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作者：Albagli, Elias; Hellwig, Christian; Tsyvinski, Aleh
作者单位：Central Bank of Chile; Universite de Toulouse; Universite Toulouse 1 Capitole; Toulouse School of Economics; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR); Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We analyze the consequences of noisy information aggregation for investment. Market imperfections create endogenous rents that cause overinvestment in upside risks and underinvestment in downside risks. In partial equilibrium, these inefficiencies are particularly severe if upside risks are coupled with easy scalability of investment. In general equilibrium, the shareholders' collective attempts to boost value of individual firms leads to a novel externality operating through price that amplif...
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作者：Lane, Tom; Nosenzo, Daniele; Sonderegger, Silvia
作者单位：University of Nottingham Ningbo China; Aarhus University; University of Nottingham; University of Nottingham
摘要：A large theoretical literature argues laws exert a causal effect on norms, but empirical evidence remains scant. Using a novel identification strategy, we provide a compelling empirical test of this proposition. We use incentivized vignette experiments to directly measure social norms relating to actions subject to legal thresholds. Our large-scale experiments (n = 7,000) run in the United Kingdom, United States, and China show that laws can causally influence social norms. Results are robust ...
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作者：Ward, Zachary
作者单位：Baylor University
摘要：A large body of evidence finds that relative mobility in the US has declined over the past 150 years. However, long-run mobility estimates are usually based on White samples and therefore do not account for the limited opportunities available for nonwhite families. Moreover, historical data measure the father's status with error, which biases estimates toward greater mobility. Using linked census data from 1850 to 1940, I show that accounting for race and measurement error can double estimates...
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作者：Pomatto, Luciano; Strack, Philipp; Tamuz, Omer
摘要：We develop an axiomatic theory of information acquisition that cap-tures the idea of constant marginal costs in information production: the cost of generating two independent signals is the sum of their costs, and generating a signal with probability half costs half its original cost. Together with Blackwell monotonicity and a continuity condition, these axioms determine the cost of a signal up to a vector of param-eters. These parameters have a clear economic interpretation and determine the ...
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作者：De Janvry, Alain; He, Guojun; Sadoulet, Elisabeth; Wang, Shaoda; Zhang, Qiong
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Hong Kong; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Renmin University of China
摘要：Subjective performance evaluation could induce influence activities: employees might devote too much effort to pleasing their evaluator, relative to working toward the goals of the organization itself. We conduct a randomized field experiment among Chinese local civil servants to study the existence and implications of influence activi-ties. We find that civil servants do engage in evaluator-specific influ-ence to affect evaluation outcomes, partly in the form of reallocating work efforts towa...
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作者：Malgouyres, Clement; Mayer, Thierry; Mazet-sonilhac, Clement
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut d'Etudes Politiques Paris (Sciences Po); Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Bocconi University
摘要：Suarez Serrato and Zidar (2016) identify state corporate tax inci-dence in a spatial equilibrium model with imperfectly mobile firms. Their identification argument rests on comparative statics omitting a channel implied by their model: the link between common deter-minants of a location's attractiveness and the average idiosyncratic productivity of firms choosing that location. This compositional mar-gin causes the labor demand elasticity to be independent from the product demand elasticity, i...
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作者：Brzustowski, Thomas; Georgiadis-harris, Alkis; Szentes, Balazs
作者单位：University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bonn
摘要：This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer's valua-tion is binary and his private information. The seller has access to dynamic contracts and, in each period, decides whether to deploy the previous period's contract or to replace it with a new one. The main result of the paper is that the Coase conjecture fails: the monopo-list's payoff is bounded away from the low valuation irrespective of the discount factor. (JEL D42,...
