Subjective Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: De Janvry, Alain; He, Guojun; Sadoulet, Elisabeth; Wang, Shaoda; Zhang, Qiong
• 署名单位: University of California System; University of California Berkeley; University of Hong Kong; University of Chicago; National Bureau of Economic Research; Renmin University of China
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20211207
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 766-799
• 关键词: implicit contracts; career concerns; incentives; selection; wages

摘要

Subjective performance evaluation could induce influence activities: employees might devote too much effort to pleasing their evaluator, relative to working toward the goals of the organization itself. We conduct a randomized field experiment among Chinese local civil servants to study the existence and implications of influence activi-ties. We find that civil servants do engage in evaluator-specific influ-ence to affect evaluation outcomes, partly in the form of reallocating work efforts toward job tasks that are more important and observ-able to the evaluator. Importantly, we show that introducing uncer-tainty about the evaluator's identity discourages evaluator-specific influence activities and improves bureaucratic work performance. (JEL D73, H83, J45, M54, O17, O18, P25)