Smart Contracts and the Coase Conjecturer

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Brzustowski, Thomas; Georgiadis-harris, Alkis; Szentes, Balazs
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; University of Bonn
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220357
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1334-1359
• 关键词: DURABLE-GOODS MONOPOLY; adverse selection; RENEGOTIATION; equilibria; COMMITMENT; FAILURE

摘要

This paper reconsiders the problem of a durable-good monopolist who cannot make intertemporal commitments. The buyer's valua-tion is binary and his private information. The seller has access to dynamic contracts and, in each period, decides whether to deploy the previous period's contract or to replace it with a new one. The main result of the paper is that the Coase conjecture fails: the monopo-list's payoff is bounded away from the low valuation irrespective of the discount factor. (JEL D42, D82, D86, L12)