Confidence, Self-Selection, and Bias in the Aggregates

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Enke, Benjamin; Graeber, Thomas; Oprea, Ryan
• 署名单位: Harvard University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0002-8282
• DOI: 10.1257/aer.20220915
• 发表日期: 2023
• 页码: 1933-1966
• 关键词: blind spot; overconfidence; probability; JUDGMENT; UNDERCONFIDENCE; perceptions; MARKETS

摘要

The influence of behavioral biases on aggregate outcomes depends in part on self-selection: whether rational people opt more strongly into aggregate interactions than biased individuals. In betting mar-ket, auction and committee experiments, we document that some errors are strongly reduced through self-selection, while others are not affected at all or even amplified. A large part of this variation is explained by differences in the relationship between confidence and performance. In some tasks, they are positively correlated, such that self-selection attenuates errors. In other tasks, rational and biased people are equally confident, such that self-selection has no effects on aggregate quantities. (JEL C91, D44, D91)