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作者：Saccardo, Silvia; Serra-Garcia, Marta
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Moral behavior is more prevalent when individuals cannot easily distort their beliefs self-servingly. Do individuals seek to limit or enable their ability to distort beliefs? How do these choices affect behavior? Experiments with over 9,000 participants show prefer-ences are heterogeneous-30 percent of participants prefer to limit belief distortion, while over 40 percent prefer to enable it, even if costly. A random assignment mechanism reveals that being assigned to the preferred environment ...
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作者：Onuchic, Paula; Ray, Debraj
作者单位：University of Oxford; New York University; University of Warwick
摘要：We study collaborative work in pairs when potential collaborators are motivated by the reputational implications of (joint or solo) proj-ects. In equilibrium, individual collaboration strategies both influ-ence and are influenced by the public assignment of credit for joint work across the two partners. We investigate the fragility of collabo-ration to small biases in the public's credit assignment. When collab-orators are symmetric, symmetric equilibria are often fragile, and in nonfragile eq...
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作者：Gershkov, Alex; Moldovanu, Benny; Strack, Philipp; Zhang, Mengxi
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of Surrey; University of Bonn; Yale University
摘要：We study a generalization of the classical monopoly insurance prob-lem under adverse selection (see Stiglitz 1977) where we allow for a random distribution of losses , possibly correlated with the agent's risk parameter that is private information. Our model explains pat-terns of observed customer behavior and predicts insurance con-tracts most often observed in practice: these consist of menus of several deductible-premium pairs or menus of insurance with cov-erage limits-premium pairs. A mai...
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作者：Guntin, Rafael; Ottonello, Pablo; Perez, Diego J.
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; New York University; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We study crises characterized by large adjustments of aggregate consumption through their microlevel patterns. We document the cross-sectional patterns of consumption adjustment across the income distribution and find large adjustments for top-income households, who exhibit consumption-income elasticities similar to or larger than the average. We construct a heterogeneous-agent open economy model of consumption under income fluctuations and show that the data pat-terns are largely consistent w...
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作者：Gaynor, Martin; Mehta, Nirav; Richards-Shubik, Seth
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Western University (University of Western Ontario); Lehigh University
摘要：We study health-care provider agency and optimal payments, consid-ering an expensive medication for dialysis patients. Using Medicare claims data we estimate a structural model of treatment decisions, in which providers differ in their altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is unobservable to the government. In a novel applica-tion of nonlinear pricing methods, we empirically characterize the optimal contracts in this environment. The optimal contracts eliminate medically excessiv...
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作者：Carlino, Gerald; Drautzburg, Thorsten; Inman, Robert; Zarra, Nicholas
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Philadelphia; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research; New York University
摘要：Partisanship of state governors affects the efficacy of US federal fis-cal policy. Using close election data, we find partisan differences in the marginal propensity to spend federal intergovernmental trans-fers: Republican governors spend less than Democratic governors. Correspondingly, Republican-led states have lower debt, (delayed) lower taxes, and initially lower economic activity. A New Keynesian model of partisan states in a monetary union implies sizable aggre-gate effects: The intergo...
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作者：Braxton, Carter; Taska, Bledi
作者单位：University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：We examine the role of technological change in explaining the large and persistent decline in earnings following job loss. Using detailed skill requirements from the near universe of online vacancies, we estimate technological change by occupation and find that techno-logical change accounts for 45 percent of the decline in earnings after job loss. Technological change lowers earnings after job loss by requiring workers to have new skills to perform newly created jobs in their prior occupation...
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作者：Matray, Adrien; Boissel, Charles
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作者：Masatlioglu, Yusufcan; Orhun, Yesim; Raymond, Collin
作者单位：University System of Maryland; University of Maryland Baltimore; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Cornell University
摘要：We examine whether people have an intrinsic preference for nega-tively skewed or positively skewed information structures and how these preferences relate to intrinsic preferences for informativeness. The results from lab experiments show a strong intrinsic preference for positively skewed information and suggest that providing such information can improve information uptake. Evidence from field studies in decision-and ego-relevant contexts replicates these find-ings. We discuss our findings t...
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作者：Bhaskar, Dhruva; Mcclellan, Andrew; Sadler, Evan
作者单位：City University of New York (CUNY) System; Baruch College (CUNY); University of Chicago; Columbia University
摘要：Regulators often impose rules that constrain the behavior of market participants. We study the design of regulatory policy in an insurance market as a delegation problem. A regulator restricts the menus of contracts an informed firm is permitted to offer, the firm offers a per-mitted menu to each consumer, and consumers choose contracts from offered menus. If consumer types and firm signals are ordered in a way that reflects coverage need, the regulator can leverage the firm's information by f...
