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作者：Buchmann, Nina; Field, Erica; Glennerster, Rachel; Nazneen, Shahana; Wang, Xiao Yu
作者单位：Stanford University; Duke University; National Bureau of Economic Research; University of Chicago
摘要：Child marriage remains common even where female schooling and employment opportunities have grown. We experimentally evaluate a financial incentive to delay marriage alongside a girls' empowerment program in Bangladesh. While girls eligible for two years of incen-tive are 19 percent less likely to marry underage, the empowerment program failed to decrease adolescent marriage. We show that these results are consistent with a signaling model in which bride type is imperfectly observed but prefer...
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作者：Lashkaripour, Ahmad; Lugovskyy, Volodymyr
作者单位：Indiana University System; Indiana University Bloomington
摘要：This paper examines the efficacy of second-best trade restrictions at correcting sectoral misallocation due to scale economies or prof-it-generating markups. To this end, we characterize optimal trade and industrial policies in an important class of quantitative trade models with scale effects and profits, estimating the structural parameters that govern policy outcomes. Our estimates reveal that standalone trade policy measures are remarkably ineffective at correcting mis-allocation, even whe...
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作者：Ostrovsky, Michael
作者单位：Stanford University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Choice screen auctions have been recently deployed in 31 European countries, allowing consumers to choose their preferred search engine on Google's Android platform instead of being automatically defaulted to Google's own search engine. I show that a seemingly minor detail in the design of these auctions-whether they are conducted on a per appearance or a per install basis-plays a major role in the mix and characteristics of auction winners and, consequently, in their expected market share. Fu...
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作者：Bekant, Cherry
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作者：Covert, Thomas R.; Sweeney, Richard L.
作者单位：University of Chicago; Boston College
摘要：This paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We focus on Texas, where legislative decisions in the early twentieth century assigned thousands of proximate parcels to different mineral allo-cation mechanisms. We show that during the fracking boom, which began unexpectedly decades later, auctioned leases generated at least 55 percent larger up-front payments and 40 percent more out-put than negotiated leases did. These resul...
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作者：Maggi, Giovanni; Ossa, Ralph
作者单位：Yale University; University of Zurich
摘要：We examine international regulatory agreements that are negotiated under lobbying pressures from producer groups. The way in which lobbying influences the cooperative setting of regulatory policies, as well as the welfare impacts of international agreements, depend cru-cially on whether the interests of producers in different countries are aligned or in conflict. The former situation tends to occur for prod-uct standards, while the latter tends to occur for process standards. We find that, if ...
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作者：Lopomo, Giuseppe; Persico, Nicola; Villa, Alessandro T.
作者单位：Duke University; Northwestern University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：Adverse selection in procurement arises when low-cost bidders are also low-quality suppliers. We propose a mechanism called LoLA (lowball lottery auction) which, under some conditions, maximizes any combination of buyer's and social surplus, subject to incentive compatibility, in the presence of adverse selection. The LoLA features a floor price, and a reserve price. The LoLA has a dominant strategy equilibrium that, under mild conditions, is unique. In a counterfac-tual analysis of Italian go...
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作者：Ainsworth, Robert; Dehejia, Rajeev; Pop-Eleches, Cristian; Urquiola, Miguel
作者单位：State University System of Florida; University of Florida; New York University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University; Columbia University
摘要：Romanian households could choose schools with one standard devi-ation worth of additional value added. Why do households leave value added on the table? We study two possibilities: (i) informa-tion and (ii) preferences for other school traits. In an experiment, we inform randomly selected households about schools' value added. These households choose schools with up to 0.2 standard deviations of additional value added. We then estimate a discrete choice model and show that households have pref...
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作者：Lind, Nelson; Ramondo, Natalia
作者单位：Emory University; Boston University; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a trade model with correlation in productivity across coun-tries. The model spans the full class of generalized extreme value import demand systems and implies that countries with relatively dissimilar technology gain more from trade. In the context of a multisector trade model, we provide a tractable and flexible estimation procedure for correlation based on compressing highly disaggregate sectoral data into a few latent factors related to technology classes. We estimate significan...
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作者：Aghion, Philippe; Bergeaud, Antonin; Van Reenen, John
作者单位：Universite PSL; College de France; INSEAD Business School; Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC) Paris; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：We present a framework that can be used to assess the equilibrium impact of regulation on endogenous innovation with heterogeneous firms. We implement this model using French firm-level panel data, where there is a sharp increase in the burden of labor regulations on companies with 50 or more employees. Consistent with the model's qualitative predictions, we find a fall in the fraction of innovating firms just to the left of the regulatory threshold. Furthermore, we find a reduction in the inn...
