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作者：Boergers, Tilman; Cox, Ingemar; Pesendorfer, Martin; Petricek, Vaclav
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second-price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on search engines. We construct a model that embodies few prior assumptions about parameters, and we present results that indicate that this model has under quite general assumptions a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We then analyze bid data assuming that advertisers choose Nash equilibrium bids. We offer preliminary conclusions abo...
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作者：Roger, Guillaume
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for misreporting interacts with the ex ante incentives for effort. This affects the shape and properties of the optimal contract, which fails to elicit truthful revelation in all states. In this setup audit...
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作者：Arad, Ayala; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general pro...
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作者：Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：I study the consistency of incentive compatibility with several stability notions for a one-to-one matching market with transfers. Ex post stability, studied in the matching literature, is too strong to be satisfied together with incentive compatibility. Therefore, I introduce weaker stability notions: ex ante stability and interim stability. Although ex ante stability is consistent with incentive compatibility when agents are ex ante identical or when the market is balanced, interim stability...
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作者：Bardhan, Pranab; Mookherjee, Dilip; Tsumagari, Masatoshi
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Boston University; Keio University
摘要：We study a competitive theory of middlemen with brand-name reputations necessary to overcome product quality moral hazard problems. Agents with heterogeneous abilities sort into different sectors and occupations. Middleman margins do not equalize across sectors if production of different goods are differentially prone to moral hazard, generating endogenous mobility barriers. We embed the model in a setting of North-South trade, and explore the distributive implications of trade liberalization....
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作者：Conlon, Christopher T.; Mortimer, Julie Holland
作者单位：Columbia University; Boston College; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Incomplete product availability is an important feature of many markets, and ignoring changes in availability may bias demand estimates. We study a new dataset from a wireless inventory system on vending machines to track product availability every four hours. The data allow us to account for product availability when estimating demand, and provide valuable variation for identifying substitution patterns when products stock out. We develop a procedure that allows for changes in product availab...
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作者：Armantier, Olivier; Holt, Charles A.; Plott, Charles R.
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; University of Virginia; California Institute of Technology
摘要：The proposed 2008 TARP auction was intended to remove toxic assets from portfolios of financially stressed banks. The Treasury selected a design whereby bids to sell different securities would be normalized by reference prices that reflect relative value estimates. We conduct a series of experiments indicating that a simple Reference Price Auction can be an effective mechanism for avoiding serious effects of adverse selection and strategic bid manipulation, even with inaccurate reference price...
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作者：Jaffe, Sonia; Weyl, E. Glen
作者单位：Harvard University; University of Chicago; University of Chicago
摘要：Using information local to the premerger equilibrium, we derive approximations of the expected changes in prices and welfare generated by a merger. We extend the pricing pressure approach of recent work to allow for non-Bertrand conduct, adjusting the diversion ratio and incorporating the change in anticipated accommodation. To convert pricing pressures into quantitative estimates of price changes, we multiply them by the merger pass-through matrix, which (under conditions we specify) is appro...
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作者：Fuchs, William; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Stanford University
摘要：We study dynamic bargaining with private information and a deadline. As commitment power disappears, there is a clear deadline effect. That is, trade takes place smoothly before the deadline and with an atom right at the deadline. Prices, timing of trade, and the deadline effect respond to the consequences of not reaching an agreement. Bleaker disagreement options lead to more trade and proportionally more of the agreements taking place on the verge of the deadline. Time to deadline can affect...
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作者：Gayle, Philip G.
作者单位：Kansas State University
摘要：Previous research has suggested that codeshare agreements eliminate double marginalization that exists when unaffiliated airlines independently determine the price for different segments of an interline trip. Using a structural econometric model, this paper investigates whether codeshare contracts do eliminate double marginalization. The results suggest that both upstream and downstream margins persist when the operating carrier of a codeshare product also offers competing single-carrier produ...
