A Procurement Auction for Toxic Assets with Asymmetric Information
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Armantier, Olivier; Holt, Charles A.; Plott, Charles R.
署名单位：
Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - New York; University of Virginia; California Institute of Technology
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.5.4.142
发表日期：
2013
页码：
142-162
关键词：
摘要：
The proposed 2008 TARP auction was intended to remove toxic assets from portfolios of financially stressed banks. The Treasury selected a design whereby bids to sell different securities would be normalized by reference prices that reflect relative value estimates. We conduct a series of experiments indicating that a simple Reference Price Auction can be an effective mechanism for avoiding serious effects of adverse selection and strategic bid manipulation, even with inaccurate reference prices. Beyond the TARP auction, our results are relevant to various multi-object auctions with value heterogeneity.
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