Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Boergers, Tilman; Cox, Ingemar; Pesendorfer, Martin; Petricek, Vaclav
署名单位：
University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
刊物名称：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
ISSN/ISSBN：
1945-7669
DOI：
10.1257/mic.5.4.163
发表日期：
2013
页码：
163-187
关键词：
摘要：
This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second-price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on search engines. We construct a model that embodies few prior assumptions about parameters, and we present results that indicate that this model has under quite general assumptions a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We then analyze bid data assuming that advertisers choose Nash equilibrium bids. We offer preliminary conclusions about advertisers' true willingness to bid for sponsored search listings. We find that advertisers' true willingness to bid is multi-dimensional and decreasing in listing position.
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