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作者：Clark, Robert; Houde, Jean-Francois
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal; HEC Montreal; University of Pennsylvania; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We point out a fundamental difficulty of successfully colluding in retail markets with heterogeneous firms, and characterize the mechanism recent gasoline cartels in Canada used to sustain collusion. Heterogeneity in cost and network size necessitates arrangements whereby participants split the market unequally to favor stronger players. We characterize empirically the strategy and transfer mechanism using court documents containing summaries and extracts of conversations between participants....
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作者：Miravete, Eugenio J.
作者单位：University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin; Center for Economic & Policy Research (CEPR)
摘要：Firms engage in foggy pricing when the menu of tariff options aims at profiting from consumer mistakes. The analysis of this paper concludes that the transition from monopoly to competition in the early US cellular telephone industry does not generally foster the use of such deceptive strategies. I offer three alternative measures to account for the fogginess of the menu of options offered by cellular carriers. All results are robust to the existence of uncertainty regarding future consumption...
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作者：Boergers, Tilman; Cox, Ingemar; Pesendorfer, Martin; Petricek, Vaclav
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; University of London; University College London; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
摘要：This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second-price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on search engines. We construct a model that embodies few prior assumptions about parameters, and we present results that indicate that this model has under quite general assumptions a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We then analyze bid data assuming that advertisers choose Nash equilibrium bids. We offer preliminary conclusions abo...
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作者：Roger, Guillaume
作者单位：University of Sydney
摘要：I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for misreporting interacts with the ex ante incentives for effort. This affects the shape and properties of the optimal contract, which fails to elicit truthful revelation in all states. In this setup audit...
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作者：Sautmann, Anja
作者单位：Brown University
摘要：This paper experimentally tests the predictions of a principal-agent model in which the agent has biased beliefs about his ability. Overconfident workers are found to earn lower wages than underconfident ones because they overestimate their expected payoff, and principals adjust their offers accordingly. Moreover, the profit-maximizing contract distorts effort by varying incentives according to self-confidence, although only the most successful principals use this strategy. These findings have...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Lin, Charles
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Some individuals vote because they are motivated by a civic duty to do so, whereas others may vote because they wish to appear prosocial to others. This paper proposes a simple framework that captures these motivations, and provides results consistent with findings on turnout, e.g., that turnout is responsive to the expected closeness and importance of an election, to the observability of one's choice to vote, and to social rewards and punishments associated with voting. We study various exten...
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作者：Gale, Ian; O'Brien, Daniel P.
作者单位：Georgetown University
摘要：A use-or-lose provision requires that firms employ a certain minimum fraction of their productive capacity. Variants have been used by regulators in the airline and wireless communications industries, among others. A typical stated objective is to limit capacity hoarding, thereby increasing aggregate output and welfare. When the dominant firm is more efficient than fringe firms, we find that imposing a use-or-lose provision induces the dominant firm to acquire capacity from the fringe, which c...
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作者：Schummer, James; Vohra, Rakesh V.
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle varian...
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作者：Arad, Ayala; Rubinstein, Ariel
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Tel Aviv University; New York University
摘要：A strategic (round-robin) tournament is a simultaneous n-player game built on top of a symmetric two-player game G. Each player chooses one action in G and is matched to play G against all other players. The winner of the tournament is the player who achieves the highest total G-payoff. The tournament has several interpretations as an evolutionary model, as a model of social interaction, and as a model of competition between firms with procedurally rational consumers. We prove some general pro...
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作者：Yenmez, M. Bumin
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：I study the consistency of incentive compatibility with several stability notions for a one-to-one matching market with transfers. Ex post stability, studied in the matching literature, is too strong to be satisfied together with incentive compatibility. Therefore, I introduce weaker stability notions: ex ante stability and interim stability. Although ex ante stability is consistent with incentive compatibility when agents are ex ante identical or when the market is balanced, interim stability...
