Optimal Contract under Moral Hazard with Soft Information

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Roger, Guillaume
• 署名单位: University of Sydney
• 刊物名称: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MICROECONOMICS
• ISSN/ISSBN: 1945-7669
• DOI: 10.1257/mic.5.4.55
• 发表日期: 2013
• 页码: 55-80
• 关键词: 1st-order approach; principal; insurance; RISK

摘要

I study a model of moral hazard with soft information: the agent alone observes the stochastic outcome of her action; hence the principal faces a problem of ex post adverse selection. With limited instruments the principal cannot solve these two problems independently; the ex post incentive for misreporting interacts with the ex ante incentives for effort. This affects the shape and properties of the optimal contract, which fails to elicit truthful revelation in all states. In this setup audit and transfer become strategic complements; this is rooted in the nonseparability of the problem.